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Comment 
It Can’t Get That Ugly: Why Employers 
Should Be Able to Take Aesthetics into 
Consideration 
By Thomas Pagliarini* 
I. INTRODUCTION: SELLING MORE THAN JUST THE “BEST COFFEE IN 
TOWN” 
In the summer of 2012, the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) intensified an investigation into the 
Marylou’s coffee chain on grounds that Marylou’s allegedly 
discriminates against job applicants.  In sum, seven charges were 
filed against the chain.1  Interestingly, the investigation was not 
prompted by the filing of any complaints on the part of disgruntled 
turned-down applicants, but rather, began from within the EEOC 
itself as a “Commission-initiated investigation.”2  The general 
 
*Lord of Sealand; Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University 
School of Law, 2014; B.A., Bryant University, 2011.  I’d like to thank the 
editors of the Law Review, especially Alyse Galoski  and Maura Clancy for 
their diligent editing of this Comment.  Credit to Nick Nybo for something, 
but mostly for the sake of symmetry.  Lastly, to my parents, for everything.  
 1.  Nicole Oliverio, Mary Lou’s Being Investigated for Discrimination, 
WHDHNEWS.COM, May 24, 2012, http://www1.whdh.com/news 
/articles/local/south/12007556046098/marylou-s-being-investigated-for-
discrimination/.   
 2.  James McDonald, Here's Looking At You, Kid” - The EEOC Looks 
For Beauty Bias,  FISHER & PHILLIPS, L.L.P. ATTORNEYS AT LAW (July 2, 2012), 
available at http://www.laborlawyers.com/19073. 
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thrust behind the investigation was that Marylou’s, with its “pink” 
branded image, only hires young attractive women for its barista 
positions and that “it’s possible that applicants or employees 
might not know that they have been discriminated against.”3  In 
conducting its investigation, the EEOC sifted through the 
company’s job applications and interviewed employees about the 
company’s work environment and the age, race, and even body 
types of their fellow employees. 
Boldly asserted on each cup of Marylou’s is that the company 
serves the “Best Coffee in Town.”  However, like all other food and 
beverage service-based companies, Marylou’s undeniably is selling 
more than just a simple food or beverage product.  Indeed, when 
founder Marylou Sandry opened her first Marylou’s coffee shop in 
1986, she set out to build a business with a “friendly atmosphere” 
that would be a “fun place to visit and work.”4  In doing so, Sandry 
sought to establish a particular brand, which—with over thirty 
locations and counting—has been quite successful.5  Sandry 
attributes the company’s success in large part to carefully 
selecting “quality, dedicated people” from amongst its pool of 
applicants.6  This careful selection process, Sandry believes, has 
led to the creation of “a staff which has literally become famous,” 
and stores that “specialize” not only in assorted pastries and a 
“perfect coffee product,” but also “in happy faces or a smile and a 
wink.”7  Such fame, no doubt, spurred the interest of the EEOC, 
whose investigation Sandry has described as a modern day “witch 
hunt.”8 
While ultimately Marylou’s was cleared of all charges,9 the 
 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  About Marylou’s, MARYLOU’S COFFEE, http://www.marylous.com 
/about.html (last visited Aug. 5, 2013) (hereinafter “Marylou’s Coffee”). 
 5.  Locations, MARYLOU’S COFFEE, http://www.marylous.com/ 
locations.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2013). 
 6.  Crystal Haynes, Former Employee Discusses Marylou’s Coffee 
Culture, MYFOXBOSTON.COM (May 26, 2012), http://www.myfoxboston.com 
/story/18633001/2012/05/26/former-employee-discusses-marylous-coffee-
culture.  
 7.  Marylou’s Coffee, supra note 4.   
 8.  Federal Official Defends Discrimination Probe of Marylou’s Coffee 
Shop Chain, PATRIOT LEDGER (June 8, 2012),  http://www.patriotledger.com 
/topstories/x1222854722/Feds-defend-probe-of-Marylou-s-coffee-shop-
chain#ixzz2KX1wSXMp [hereinafter Federal Official Defends]. 
 9.  Cara Kenefick, Marylou’s Cleared of Discrimination Charges, 
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situation provides an opportunity to explore how courts and 
scholars have addressed the complex nature of the role aesthetics 
plays in Employment Law and what the future holds for 
employers like Marylou’s.  Exploring the circumstances 
surrounding the investigation into Marylou’s and other companies 
will shed light on the logic (or lack thereof) of aesthetic- or 
appearance-based employment discrimination claims. 
Part I of this comment provides a discussion of the history of 
aesthetic employment discrimination litigation and various 
federal and state statutory proposals designed to protect against 
such practices.10  This section will demonstrate how employees, in 
the absence of available legal protections for aesthetic 
discrimination, have attempted to “fit” arguably aesthetic-based 
claims into established frameworks for protected classes.11 
Part II argues why aesthetic discrimination claims should not 
be allowed.  Disallowing claims based on aesthetics would grant 
employers much more control over their businesses and the 
management of employees.  Provided compliance with other 
antidiscrimination laws, employers would be free to shape their 
work environment in a manner best suited for their particular 
business.12  Additionally, expanding the availability of exceptions 
 
NEWPORT PATCH (Oct., 25, 2012), http://newport.patch.com/articles/marylous-
cleared-of-discrimination-charges-fdc2113b.  Sandry was able to happily say 
that her company was cleared of all charges of discrimination when she 
received a South Shore Women’s Business Network Business Achievement 
Award in October of 2012.  Id.  Interestingly, in a Hingham Patch online 
reader poll (though admittedly not scientific), readers answered the question 
“Do You Think Marylou’s Hiring Practices are Prejudice/Sexist?” in the 
negative by a margin of 67% (out of 49 votes).  Tony Catinella, POLL: Do You 
Think Marylou's Hiring Practices are Prejudice/Sexist?, HINGHAM PATCH 
(May 31, 2012), http://hingham.patch.com/articles/do-you-think-marylou-s-
hiring-practices-are-prejudice-sexist. 
 10.  Mila Gumin, Note, Ugly on the Inside: An Argument for A Narrow 
Interpretation of Employer Defenses to Appearance Discrimination, 96 MINN. 
L. REV. 1769, 1773 (2012). 
 11.  William R. Corbett, Hotness Discrimination: Appearance 
Discrimination As A Mirror for Reflecting on the Body of Employment-
Discrimination Law, 60 CATH. U.L. REV. 615, 633 (2011).   
 12.  Alyssa Newcomb & Tanya Rivero, Melissa Nelson: Dental Assistant 
Fired For Being “Irresistible” Is “Devastated,” ABCNEWS.COM (Dec. 23, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/headlines/2012/12/melissa-nelson-dental-
assistant-fired-for-being-irresistible-is-devastated/.  Conversely, if aesthetic-
based discrimination claims were permitted, it would open the door for full-
fledged reverse discrimination claims.  Corbett, supra note 11, at 640.  This 
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to antidiscrimination laws based on bona fide occupational 
qualification and business necessity for purely aesthetic purposes 
would enable employers to fully deliver a holistic product of 
“branded service.”13  Part II further argues that aesthetics should 
be considered a legitimate hiring criterion for all types of job 
positions, not just those that historically “sell looks.” 
Part III explains that although empowering employers to 
shape their particular “branded service” based on aesthetics could 
lend itself to certain potential abuses, employment discrimination 
will not get that ugly.  Desiring individuals with certain qualities 
(e.g. naturally blonde hair, blue eyes) may inherently have a 
disparate impact against certain protected classes under Title VII.  
Similarly, unfettered deference to a particular employer’s 
aesthetic preferences could be viewed as providing a backdoor way 
to unlawfully discriminate against protected classes (e.g. an 
employer’s personal aesthetic preference for a particular race).  
However, by ensuring robust enforcement of the current statutory 
and common law protections, an appropriate balance can be 
struck that will be beneficial to both employees and employers. 
PART I 
A.   EEOC’s Investigation into Marylou’s 
The probe into Marylou’s hiring practices was part of what is 
called a “Commission-initiated investigation.”14  Generally, the 
EEOC operates pursuant to its statutory authority by 
investigating and pressing legal action in response to charges that 
allege a pattern or practice of discrimination under various federal 
statutes that are filed by a member of the EEOC or by an 
aggrieved individual.15  However, the EEOC is also authorized to 
 
would compound the unmanageable nature of finding a basis for aesthetic 
discrimination claims.  Would a complainant have to first prove whether it 
would be preferable to be aesthetically more pleasing or less pleasing for the 
particular position before filing a claim?  See Newcomb and Rivero, supra 
note 12.  
 13.  Dianne Avery & Marion Crain, Branded: Corporate Image, Sexual 
Stereotyping, and the New Face of Capitalism, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 
13, 18 (2007). 
 14.  Strategic Plan for Fiscal Years 2012–2016, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION 8, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/ 
strategic_plan_12to16.pdf.  
 15.  Id.  The EEOC enforces the following federal laws:  Title VII of the 
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initiate its own directed investigations under the Equal Pay Act of 
1963 (“EPA”) and Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(“ADEA”), even in the absence of any charge or allegation of 
discrimination.16  Through this device, the EEOC can initiate a 
formal investigation against an employer, seek information and 
data from the employer, and then ultimately file suit for any 
violations of the statutes.17  It appears that after a nearly year-
long investigation into Marylou’s, seven charges were filed against 
the employer.18  However, after scouring through the company’s 
application materials and interviewing applicants that did not 
gain employment, the EEOC ultimately dropped its charges.19 
Throughout the investigation, the EEOC adamantly insisted 
that it was not trying to extend antidiscrimination protection to 
encompass aesthetics.20  In fact, as a matter of law, the EEOC 
could not simply create an entirely new basis of employment 
 
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act of 1967 (“ADEA”), the Equal Pay Act of 1963 (“EPA”), Section 501 of the 
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Title I and Title V of the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), and the Genetic Information Non-
Discrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”).  Id. at 7. 
 16.  Terrence H. Murphy & Marcy L. McGovern, The Scope of EEOC 
Investigations, 2012 A.B.A. SEC. LAB. AND EMP. LAW 2, available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2012/03/ 
national_conference_on_equal_employment_opportunity_law/mw2012eeo_mu
rphy.authcheckdam.pdf.  
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Oliverio, supra note 1. The article states that charges were filed “on 
the behalf of people who weren’t hired.”  Id.  It appears that the charges that 
were levied were by an EEOC Commissioner after former applicants were 
tracked down and interviewed by the EEOC during its investigation. John 
Zaremba, Feds Talk to Marylou’s Applicants, BOSTONHERALD.COM (June 7, 
2012), http://bostonherald.com/news_opinion/local_coverage/2012/06/ 
feds_talk_marylou%E2%80%99s_applicants. An EEOC spokesperson, Justine 
Lisser, explained that Commissioner charges often arise out of information 
gathered from victims who are too afraid to bring a charge on their own 
behalf and that such “charges are not tools for fishing expeditions, but are 
designed to institute an investigation of specific discriminatory practices.”  
Mary Swanton, EEOC Investigates Coffee Chain for Barista Beauty Bias, 
INSIDE COUNSEL (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com 
/2012/08/23/eeoc-investigates-coffee-chain-for-barista-beauty.  
 19.  Kenefick, supra note 9.  Throughout, Sandry had asserted that she 
was merely choosing the most qualified candidates from those that applied.  
Id.  Indeed, there is nothing discriminatory if certain groups are not 
represented at a particular firm if there is no indication that they ever 
applied for any positions. 
 20.  Swanton, supra note 18. 
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protection on its own, and there is currently no federal law that 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of aesthetics alone.  
However, the EEOC’s investigation into Marylou’s shares many 
similarities with suits filed by individuals that have tried—with 
varying degrees of success—to couch what were ostensibly 
aesthetic discrimination arguments into established employment 
discrimination frameworks. 
B.   Fitting Aesthetics In 
In his latest piece on aesthetic employment discrimination, 
Professor William R. Corbett provides an outline of various 
examples of “fitting” within the aesthetic discrimination context.21  
Fitting occurs when there is no explicit statutory or common law 
basis for a particular claim, but in an effort to recover, an 
employee pulls his or her case from the periphery to fall under, or 
otherwise “fit,” an existing protected characteristic.22  Corbett 
argues that fitting is one of the common ways in which 
employment discrimination law does—and he argues should—
operate for all types of claims.23  He asserts that “fitting affords 
courts some discretion in patrolling the fringes of employment-
discrimination law,” which allows appropriate cases falling within 
the penumbras of protected characteristics to obtain judicial 
review.24  Fitting compensates for the gaps in statutory protection, 
which exist, in part, due to the difficulty in passing truly broad, 
comprehensive antidiscrimination legislation.25  Additionally, the 
ability to fit claims serves as a check on employers from abusing 
their power to discharge employees under an employment-at-will 
regime.26 
The multitude of factors that shape an individual’s overall 
outward appearance make aesthetic-based cases susceptible to 
attempts to fit claims under a wide range of discrimination 
theories.  Public sector employees have attempted to challenge 
 
 21.  Corbett, supra note 11, at 633. 
 22.  William R. Corbett, The Ugly Truth About Appearance 
Discrimination and the Beauty of Our Employment Discrimination Law, 11 
DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 153, 158 (2007). 
 23.  Corbett, supra note 11, at 639. 
 24.  Id. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 639–40. 
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grooming policies and dress code requirements under the 
guarantee of liberty in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.27  These attempts to garner 
substantive due process protection for aesthetics have been largely 
unsuccessful because courts scrutinize such challenges under the 
heavy deference of rational basis review.28  Courts have noted that 
even if an employee has some type of constitutional interest in his 
or her appearance generally, such an interest does not inherently 
shelter the individual from the legitimate demands of employers 
regarding their business and administrative judgment.29 
However, instead of trying to fit an aesthetic claim under the 
amorphous and unpredictable protections of substantive due 
process, employees can also fit an aesthetic claim under the 
protections of Title VII.30  For example, in Sadruddin v. City of 
Newark, a Muslim firefighter challenged a regulation that 
prohibited facial hair.31  Despite the facial hair prohibition being 
nearly identical to the regulation in Kelley32 and the City of 
Newark additionally asserting that the regulation was “necessary 
to safely and effectively wear the self-contained breathing 
apparatus (“SCBA”) used by Newark firefighters,” the court held 
that the firefighter stated a prima facie religious discrimination 
claim under Title VII.33  The different outcomes in these cases 
 
 27.  Stacey S. Baron, Note, (UN)Lawfully Beautiful: The Legal 
(DE)Construction of Female Beauty, 46 B.C. L. REV. 359, 369–70 (2005).   For 
example, in Kelley v. Johnson, a police officer challenged the validity of a 
county’s hair grooming regulation for male members of the police force.  425 
U.S. 238, 239 (1976).  The officer argued that the department’s facial hair 
regulations violated his right of free expression under the First Amendment, 
through the Due Process Clause, because the regulations were allegedly “not 
based upon the generally accepted standard of grooming in the community” 
and placed “‘an undue restriction’ upon his activities therein.”  Id. at 240–41.  
Finding that the desire to have uniformity in police officer appearance in 
order to make officers more readily recognizable to the public and a desire to 
build an esprit de corps were both rationally related to public safety, the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutional validity of the regulation.  Id. at 
248–49. 
 28.  Baron, supra note 27, at 369–70. 
 29.  Tardif v. Quinn, 545 F.2d 761, 763 (1st Cir. 1976). 
 30.  Heather R. James, Note, If you are Attractive and You Know It, 
Please Apply: Appearance Based Discrimination and Employer’s Discretion, 
42 VAL. U. L. REV. 629, 649 (2008). 
 31.  34 F. Supp. 2d 923, 924 (D.N.J. 1999). 
 32.  425 U.S. at 239. 
 33.  Sadruddin, 34 F. Supp. 2d at 924. 
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lend support to the proposition that “not all employment 
discrimination laws are equal, either when created or as applied 
or developed.”34 
The varying degrees of successful fitting can often depend on 
the immutability of the characteristic that is allegedly being 
discriminated against.35  This is true even if the employee alleges 
the specific characteristic’s historical and cultural value to a 
particular race, or even a particular sex of members of that race.36  
For example, in Rogers v. American Airlines, the court dismissed 
the claims of female African-American employees alleging that a 
grooming policy that prohibited the wearing of braided hair was 
discriminatory against women and, in particular, black women.37  
The court explained that “[a]n all-braided hair style is an ‘easily 
changed characteristic,’ and, even if socioculturally associated 
with a particular race or nationality, is not an impermissible basis 
for distinctions in the application of employment practices by an 
employer.”38 
Employees have also attempted to fit their claims under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act by asserting that being 
unattractive or overweight is a disability.39  In most cases where 
employees allege discrimination because of obesity, the employees 
are unsuccessful because they are unable to show the 
requirements that their employer views them as impaired, that 
 
 34.  Corbett, supra note 22, at 160.  In fact, not even claims alleged under 
the same antidiscrimination statute bear equal force.  For example, in 
Cloutier v. Costco Wholesale Corporation, an employee asked for a reasonable 
accommodation to an employer’s “no facial jewelry policy” because of her 
religious beliefs as a practicing member of the Church of Body Modification.  
390 F.3d 126, 128 (1st Cir. 2004).  Despite this, the First Circuit held that the 
employer had no duty to even accommodate the employee’s religious beliefs—
wearing facial jewelry—because forcing the company to do so would create an 
“undue hardship.”  Id. 
 35.  Elizabeth M. Adamitis, Comment, Appearance Matters:  A Proposal 
to Prohibit Appearance Discrimination in Employment, 75 WASH. L. REV. 195, 
205–06 (2000). 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  527 F. Supp. 229, 234 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 38.  Id. at 232.  Contra EEOC Dec. No. 71-2444, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 
(BNA) 18 (1971) (“[W]e note that the wearing of an Afro-American hair style 
by a Negro has been so appropriated as a cultural symbol by members of the 
Negro race as to make its suppression either an automatic badge of racial 
prejudice or a necessary abridgement of first amendment rights.”).  
 39.  Baron, supra note 27, at 375–76. 
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their condition is caused by a physiological disorder, or that there 
is a substantial limitation upon their life activities.40 
Additionally, some courts have addressed the practical 
concerns of an employee’s weight and visual appearance in 
regards to the particular position the employee is applying for.41  
For example, in Goodman v. L.A. Weight Loss Centers, Inc., a 350-
pound man suffering from morbid obesity applied for a sales 
counselor position.42   The employer was “a company that provides 
weight reduction plans to clients, with an emphasis on one-on-one 
coaching and maintenance of a healthy lifestyle.”43  After an 
initial interview, the interviewer explained to the applicant that, 
although on paper she thought the applicant was the “most 
qualified,” her manager expressed concerns about the applicant’s 
weight.44  Ultimately, the employer rejected the applicant 
asserting that the organization “was an ‘image conscious’ company 
and his weight would send the ‘wrong message’ to [the company’s] 
overweight clientele.”45 The court ultimately dismissed the 
applicant’s complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief 
could be granted.46  Explaining its rationale, the court stated that: 
it is well established that an employer is permitted to 
make hiring decisions based on certain physical 
characteristics.  The mere fact that Defendant was aware 
of Plaintiff’s weight and rejected his application for fear 
that his appearance did not accord with the company 
image is not improper. To hold otherwise would render an 
employer’s ability to hire based on certain physical 
characteristics entirely void.47 
The court explained that it was not as though the employer 
perceived the applicant as being “substantially limited in the 
performance of a wide range of work-related tasks or varying 
 
 40.  Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61 STAN. L. REV. 
1033, 1080 (2009). 
 41.  Corbett, supra note 22, at 164. 
 42.  Goodman v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., No. 04-CV-3471, 2005 WL 
241180, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 1, 2005). 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at *3. 
 47.  Id. at *3 (emphasis added). 
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positions.”48  Rather, it was because, in the employer’s belief, the 
applicant’s obese appearance “was manifestly inconsistent with 
the product it was trying to sell.”49 
While attempts to fit aesthetic claims arise from a variety of 
angles, the ones that receive a vast amount of the attention of 
courts and commentators—and those most relevant to 
Marylou’s—are those that are fit under sex (and sexual 
harassment) and gender-stereotype discrimination claims.50  One 
type of sex discrimination claim involving aesthetics is dress and 
grooming standards.  Very often, there will in fact be different 
dress and grooming standards for men and women.51  Indeed, 
employers’ policies may distinguish between men and women that 
may be based somewhat on conventional societal norms.52  
However, in establishing different criteria for men and women, 
the purported standards must place an equal burden on each of 
the sexes.53  For example, in Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 
Inc., the Ninth Circuit upheld the validity of a casino’s grooming 
policy that set different specific requirements for men and women 
regarding how each employee’s hair, hands, and face must 
appear.54  Despite the policy’s requirement that women—and only 
women—must wear makeup, and the female employee’s assertion 
 
 48.  Id.  However, in Cook v. Rhode Island, Department of Mental Health, 
Retardation & Hospitals, the First Circuit upheld a jury verdict for an 
employee that claimed she was refused employment because the employer 
perceived her obesity as a disability.  10 F.3d 17, 26 (1st Cir. 1993).  The 
court stated that the employee could recover under a perceived disability 
theory by “demonstrating that she was treated as if she had an impairment 
that substantially limits a major life activity.”  Id. at 25.  Additionally, in 
addressing immutability, the court found that “the jury reasonably could 
have inferred that [the employer] regarded plaintiff's morbid obesity as an 
‘impairment of a continuing nature.’”  Id. at 24.  In contrast, in Goodman, the 
employer acknowledged it believed the applicant could lose the requisite 
weight and even encouraged him to reapply at that point.  Goodman, 2005 
WL 241180, at *2. 
 49.  Goodman, 2005 WL 241180, at *8. 
 50.  Mary Nell Trautner & Samantha Kwan, Gendered Appearance 
Norms:  An Analysis of Employment Discrimination Lawsuits, 1970–2008, 20 
RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF WORK 127, 135 (2010) (stating that 118 out of 
201, or 58.7% of appearance discrimination cases from 1970 to 2008 involved 
some type of allegation of discrimination on the basis of sex). 
 51.  Corbett, supra note 11, at 633. 
 52.  Adamitis, supra note 35, at 208. 
 53.  Corbett, supra note 11, at 634. 
 54.  444 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2006). 
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of the added, unreimbursed cost and time associated with such 
application, the court found that the policy did not impose an 
unequal burden on men and women.55 
While moderate leeway may be afforded to employers with 
regard to differentiation in grooming policies, employees can still 
fit an aesthetic claim under sex discrimination if the employer’s 
actions impose an impermissible gender stereotype.56 For 
example, in Lewis v. Heartland Inns of America., L.L.C., a hotel 
clerk, who was generally considered a good employee by her 
immediate supervisor, was fired by the hotel’s director of 
operations because the clerk did not have a “Midwestern girl 
look.”57  The plaintiff asserted that the employer had created a “de 
facto requirement that a female employee conform to gender 
stereotypes.”58  The court noted that the particular job description 
in the company’s personnel manual did not mention appearance 
and, in reversing summary judgment, held that there was 
evidence that the employer could have discharged the employee 
based on a gender stereotype that is arguably inherent in seeking 
an individual to comport with the “sex-specific and derogatory 
term[ ]” “[m]idwestern girl look.”59 
Further, if employers become remiss in their duties to protect 
employees and maintain the proper degree of professionalism, 
employees may be able to assert sexual harassment claims.60  An 
employer may be liable for tangible action harassment (or quid 
pro quo), when “submission to or rejection of [unwelcome sexual] 
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment 
 
 55.  Id. at 1110. 
 56.  Corbett, supra note 11, at 635.  The seminal gender stereotype case 
is Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).  In 
Price Waterhouse, the plaintiff was an associate at an accounting firm who 
alleged she was denied partnership on the basis of sex.  Id. at 232.  It was 
found that, among other comments, one partner advised that in order to 
improve her chances of becoming a partner, the plaintiff should learn to 
“walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear 
make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry.”  Id. at 235. 
 57.  591 F.3d 1033, 1036 (8th Cir. 2010). 
 58.  Id. at 1037.   
 59.  Id. at 1040–41. 
 60.  Sharon Stiller, An employer is liable under Title VII to an employee 
for a hostile environment created by a supervisor, PRAC. INSIGHTS EMP. NY 
0060 (2013).  
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decisions affecting such individual.”61  An employer may also be 
liable for sexual harassment if “bothersome attentions or sexual 
remarks [become] sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a 
hostile work environment.”62  Additionally, an employer can be 
liable for sexual harassment committed by non-employees when 
the employer, as a condition of employment, has put the employee 
in a position which subjects the employee to sexual harassment.63  
For example, in EEOC v. Sage Realty Corporation, a female 
attendant was forced to wear a poncho uniform that exposed parts 
of her thighs and buttocks.64  As a result of wearing the uniform, 
the employee was subjected to sexual propositions and lewd 
comments and gestures from non-employees.65  The employee 
reported such behavior to her supervisors, refused to wear the 
uniform any longer, and was subsequently discharged.66  The 
employee sued for sexual harassment and the district court 
agreed, finding that the employer had violated Title VII by 
requiring the employee “to wear, as a condition of her 
employment, a uniform that was revealing and sexually 
provocative and could reasonably be expected to subject her to 
sexual harassment when worn on the job and a uniform [the 
employers] knew did subject her to such harassment.”67 
PART II 
A.   The Formation of an Antidiscrimination Law 
Many of the scholars and commentators that have addressed 
aesthetic discrimination have advocated for the need to create an 
aesthetic antidiscrimination law or to expand some of the existing 
 
 61.  Karibian v. Columbia Univ., 14 F.3d 773, 777 (2d Cir. 1994) (quoting 
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)(2) (1993)).  For example, in Karibian the court 
reversed summary judgment for the employer, because the employee claimed 
that her direct supervisor threatened to fire her if she did not comply with 
the supervisor’s demands for a sexual relationship.  Id. at 779.  
 62.  Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 751 (1998).   
 63.  Robert Aalberts & Lorne Seidman, Sexual Harassment of Employees 
by Non-Employees: When Does the Employer Become Liable, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 
447, 451 (1994). 
 64.  507 F. Supp. 599, 604 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). 
 65.  Id. at 605. 
 66.  Id. at 606–08. 
 67.  Id. at 608. 
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antidiscrimination laws to cover aesthetic-based claims.68  
Standing in contrast to many of these writers, Professor Corbett 
has stated his belief that an “appearance-based discrimination law 
will not be passed” and further opining that “it is good that it will 
not.”69  Utilizing analytical factors put forth by previous scholars 
regarding what leads to the development of an antidiscrimination 
law, Corbett discusses why support for an aesthetic 
antidiscrimination law is, and likely will always be, lacking.70  He 
suggests the following factors are critical to the development of an 
antidiscrimination law: (1) moral objection to the type of 
discrimination; (2) a cohesive and identifiable group of people that 
would be covered; (3) a history of discrimination against those who 
have the characteristic; (4) immutability of the characteristic; and 
(5) irrelevance of the characteristic to job performance.71 
In each of these factors, aesthetics generally tends to 
resemble what Corbett considers the weakest of the 
antidiscrimination laws for that particular factor.72 Regarding 
moral qualms about aesthetic discrimination, Corbett posits that 
while most may find intentional discrimination based on 
 
 68.  See Gumin, supra note 10, at 1793–94; Rhode, supra note 40, at 
1048; Karen Zakrzewski, Comment, The Prevalence of “Look”ism in Hiring 
Decisions: How Federal Law Should be Amended to Prevent Appearance 
Discrimination in the Workplace, 7 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 431, 432 (2005); 
Adamitis, supra note 35, at 195.  
 69.  Corbett, supra note 22, at 161.  While this statement is seemingly 
clear on its face, Corbett’s position, at least what is gleaned from his pieces on 
aesthetic discrimination observed as a whole, does not necessarily take on an 
advocacy perspective.  See id. at 160–161; see also Corbett, supra note 11, at 
626.  Further, it should also be acknowledged that while Corbett may provide 
one of the clearest statements regarding his view on why there will not be 
some type of federal aesthetic antidiscrimination statute, other writers have 
addressed the need to provide employers with certain devices to protect 
themselves against aesthetic-based claims.  See James, supra note 30, at 
672–73; see also Lynn T. Vo, Comment, A More Attractive Look at Physical 
Appearance-Based Discrimination:  Filling the Gap in Appearance Anti-
Discrimination Law, 26 S. ILL. U. L.J. 339, 357-58 (2002).  These works are 
also significant, because in addition to containing some employer-deferential 
proposals, but also since they highlight that such views transcend gender. 
 70.  Corbett, supra note 22, at 171. 
 71.  Id. (citing Peggy R. Smith, Parental-Status Employment 
Discrimination: A Wrong in Need of a Right?, 35 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 569, 
601 (2002)).  Additionally, Corbett notes that generally there will need to be 
“sufficient political clout” in order to have a piece of legislation passed.  Id. 
 72.  Id. at 171–76. 
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aesthetics to be somewhat morally disconcerting, such avulsion is 
not as severe as that which is associated with racial 
discrimination.73  Additionally, moral objections are closely tied to 
societal conceptions of immutability; when the particular aesthetic 
feature is more easily improved, society may have less objection to 
discrimination regarding that feature.74 
Just as a particular aesthetic feature is subject to change, 
there would be even greater difficulty trying to pin down a 
discernible, cohesive group to protect against aesthetic 
discrimination.75  The timeless expression “beauty is in the eye of 
the beholder” succinctly highlights the subjectivity that would 
inherently plague aesthetic discrimination claims.76  Unlike some 
of the more traditional protected classes (e.g., race or color), which 
provide a more objective basis for determining members of the 
particular class, there is no truly objective mechanism to 
determine if an individual would be a member of an “unattractive” 
or “not aesthetically pleasing” class.77  Likewise, while there may 
be an array of anecdotes suggesting the enduring ills of aesthetic 
discrimination, the amorphous nature of such features and 
characteristics may make it difficult to document a truly 
comprehensive history of discrimination.78 
Even adamant supporters of the need to protect against 
aesthetic discrimination recognize that “[p]art of the problem is 
that attractiveness and grooming standards fall along a 
continuum,” and are left pondering, “[h]ow would employers or 
courts determine what aspects of appearance are entitled to 
protection?”79  A provocative, yet illuminating query posed by one 
prominent labor attorney is “[w]ill there be a national standard of 
 
 73.  Id. at 173. 
 74.  Id. at 173, 175. 
 75.  Id. at 173–74. 
 76.  Corbett, supra note 11, at 627–28.  Conversely, due to the stigma 
that is allegedly attached to being unattractive, individuals may not be so 
willing to come forward and assert that they believe they were fired because 
they are unattractive.  Id.  Rhode, supra note 40, at 1069.  However, to save 
face—quite literally—proud individuals could assert some type of perceived 
unattractive theory, similar to the perceived disability theory.  See Cook v. 
Rhode Island, Dep’t of Mental Health, Retardation & Hosps., 10 F.3d 17, 26 
(1st Cir. 1993).  
 77.  Corbett, supra note 22, at 173–74. 
 78.  Id. at 175. 
 79.  Rhode, supra note 40, at 1068. 
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attractiveness established by EEOC rulemaking?”80 
The last factor, irrelevance to work, necessitates further 
discussion because of its particular significance in the role of 
aesthetic discrimination discussions.  Corbett asserts that the 
“perceived irrelevance of a characteristic to work is one of the 
most complex elements in employment discrimination law.”81  The 
relevance of aesthetics in employment, Corbett correctly 
acknowledges, “depends on the job and how you define it.”82  
Indeed, this framing issue is of critical significance.  However, I 
argue that many courts and commentators have largely distorted 
the proper role that aesthetics should play in the employment and 
business context. 
B.   The Historical Mind–Body Dichotomy 
“In an ideal world, no aspect of appearance would be 
considered in employment matters.”83 
If the above statement represents the “ideal world” for 
proponents of an aesthetic antidiscrimination law, then it follows 
that their dystopia would be a world where “[p]eople will compete 
for jobs not based on substantive factors, but on how attractive 
they are.”84  Society would become so increasingly concerned with 
looks and would eventually hit rock bottom as “[a]ttractiveness 
[would] be looked at as an accomplishment in itself.”85 
Proponents of an aesthetic antidiscrimination law argue that 
“for most jobs appearance has no bearing on an individual’s ability 
 
 80.  Id. (quoting James J. McDonald Jr., Civil Rights for the 
Aesthetically-Challenged, 29 EMP. REL. L.J. 118, 127 (2003)). 
 81.  Corbett, supra note 22, at 175–76. 
 82.  Id. 
 83.  Adamitis, supra note 35, at 221. 
 84.  Zakrzewski, supra note 68, at 434.  Absolutely no disrespect is 
intended by my use of Attorney Zakrzewski’s language.  The hypothetical 
uber-aestheticized “dystopia” is merely used as a device to provoke thought 
and stimulate a dialogue about the role of aesthetics in the our society 
generally, and in the employment context more specifically. 
 85.  Id.; but see PLATO, COMPLETE WORKS 493 (John M. Cooper & D. S. 
Hutchinson eds. 1997) (“the beauty of bodies is a thing of no importance.”); 
Proverbs 4:7 (King James) (“Wisdom is the principal thing; therefore get 
wisdom.”); SOPHOCLES, THE PLAYS AND FRAGMENTS, PART III: THE ANTIGONE 
237 (Sir Richard Jebb trans., Cambridge University Press, ed., 1900) (440 
B.C.) (“Wisdom is the supreme part of happiness.”). 
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to perform.”86  By providing aesthetics with heightened scrutiny, 
an aesthetic antidiscrimination law could serve the goal of 
“break[ing] down and challeng[ing] the historic value placed on [] 
physical attractiveness.”87  In doing so, proponents hope, 
“[e]mployers would be encouraged to hire applicants based solely 
on legitimate qualifications and business concerns, instead of on 
stereotypical and unfounded assumptions.”88 
This view, exaggerated by the hypothetical dystopia, shows 
that many commentators marginalize the notion that aesthetics 
has a legitimate value.  However, even some of the staunchest 
advocates for aesthetic antidiscrimination protection acknowledge 
that in some employment contexts, such as “modeling, acting, or 
sexual entertainment,” aesthetics plays an “essential” role.89  Yet, 
at times, even the slightest movement from what these proponents 
see as essential appearance-based jobs renders, in their view, the 
value of appearance to a nullity.90  For example, one commentator 
argues that there is a distinct difference between “businesses that 
sell looks exclusively” and the restaurant server that is just 
supposed to serve food; the fitness instructor whose “primary 
purpose . . . is to instruct students on fitness moves and routines 
and ensure the health of all students, not to provide a ‘gaze object’ 
for students;” and retail clothing associates that are “primarily 
expected to provide customer service, ring up sales and keep the 
store displays neat and organized.”91 
In like turn, however, the same splicing of job functions can 
be done for the model, the actor, and the sexual entertainer as 
well.  It is the model’s job “to display, advertise and promote 
commercial products (notably fashion clothing).”92  An actor’s job 
is to “interpret[] a dramatic character” and connect with an 
audience.93  Indeed, even a stripper can justifiably be 
characterized as a “professional,” and one whose job is to render a 
 
 86.  Adamitis, supra note 35, at 195; see Gumin, supra note 10, at 1770.  
 87.  Baron, supra note 27, at 387. 
 88.  Adamitis, supra note 35, at 212. 
 89.  Rhode, supra note 40, at 1065. 
 90.  Gumin, supra note 10, at 1791–92. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  “Model (Profession)” WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model_ 
(profession)#cite_note-1.  
 93.  “Actor” WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Actor. See also, 
“Pornographic Film Actor” WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Porn_star.  
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“performance” that entices customers.94 
Such splicing appears to be done at the margins of many 
customer service-based jobs where the determination to be made 
is “whether the employer is primarily in the business of selling 
‘sex’ or is using sexual allure to market other services and 
products.”95  It is in these high-contact customer service positions 
that companies will often attempt to establish aesthetic standards 
or implement company-wide grooming policies.96  However, issues 
with aesthetic discrimination claims and attempts to impose 
aesthetic standards no doubt can permeate into non-customer 
service and other professional, behind-the-scene positions as 
well.97  Yet, whereas aesthetic discrimination may perhaps be 
somewhat tolerated in the former job categories, the notion of 
discriminating on the basis of aesthetics in the latter job 
categories stirs up much more controversy.98 
Nevertheless, what often gets overlooked by trying to impose 
such a strict dichotomy of job classifications is that aesthetics may 
be a legitimate criterion upon which to base employment decisions 
throughout all job types.99  Indeed, while commentators are quick 
to scorn the “stereotypical and unfounded assumptions,” which 
lead to “arbitrary, irrational, and unfair” hiring decisions made 
based on aesthetics, there is little acknowledgement that all 
hiring decisions are made on inherently improvable assumptions 
that bear varying degrees of success.100  Employers, like every 
other actor, make decisions in a state of inherent uncertainty.101  
 
 94.  “Stripper” WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stripper# 
Performance;  see also “Prostitution” WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Prostitute.  
 95.  Avery & Crain, supra note 13, at 44. 
 96.  Rhode, supra note 40, at 1064. 
 97.  Corbett, supra note 11, at 621–22. 
 98.  Avery and Crain describe this as the difference between selling sex 
and using sex (to allure customers).  Avery & Crain, supra note 13, at 44.   
 99.  Timothy A. Judge, Charlice Hurst, and Lauren S. Simon, Does it Pay 
to be Smart, Attractive, or Confident (or all Three)? Relationships Among 
General Mental Ability, Physical Attractiveness, Core Self-Evaluations, and 
Income, 94 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 742, 751 (2009).  
 100.  Adamitis, supra note 35, at 212. 
 101.  The concept of “Bounded Rationality” was developed by the 
economist Hebert Simon to describe the reality that actors are constrained 
from making completely rational decisions because their decision 
environment is too complex (too much information) in relation to the actor’s 
mental and computational abilities (unable to process) and the lack of enough 
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To compensate, decision makers rely on certain rules of thumb 
and other heuristics to guide their thought processes.102  For 
example, in the employment context, an individual’s résumé is 
used as the key starting point in the hiring process.103  Armed 
with nothing but a candidate’s résumé by itself, employers often 
make an initial—and perhaps even at times final—determination 
of whether the candidate fits with “the demands of the job 
vacancy” and the values of the organization.104  Thus, in a way, 
the résumé provides a rule of thumb to guide an uncertain 
employment decision.105  The rule of thumb operates on both 
sides: the candidate appeals to it by trying to convey that he or 
she will be able to perform competently and the employer makes a 
decision in hopes that a desirable feature will translate into 
competent performance.  Acknowledging this is by no means an 
attack on the use of résumés in the hiring process.106  Rather, it is 
just to highlight that, in the end, whatever the hiring decision to 
be made, it will rely on assumptions regarding competency that 
cannot be proven until after the fact.107 
 
time.  David Dequech, Bounded Rationality, Institutions, and Uncertainty, 35 
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES 911, 912–13 (2001). 
 102.  Id. at 920. 
 103.  Wei-Chi Tsai et al., The Effects of Applicant Résumé Contents on 
Recruiters’ Hiring Recommendations: The Mediating Roles of Recruiter Fit 
Perceptions, 60 APPLIED PSYCHOLOGY: AN INTERNATIONAL REVIEW 231, 231 
(2001). 
 104.  Id. at 232. 
 105.  The same holds true for certain characteristics and behaviors that 
are exhibited during an interview, a process which is also replete with its 
own problems of uncertainty.  See Marc-André Reinhard, Martin Scharmach, 
and Patrick Müller, It’s not what you are, it’s what you know: experience, 
beliefs, and the detection of deception in employment interviews, JOURNAL OF 
APPLIED SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 10 (2013) (finding that sample including high 
percentage of experienced hiring professionals were only slightly above 
chance at discerning lies and truths). 
 106.  Cf. John Sullivan, What’s Wrong With Using Resumes For Hiring? 
Pretty Much Everything, ERE.NET (July 16, 2012 5:16 AM), available at 
http://www.ere.net/2012/07/16/what%E2%80%99s-wrong-with-using-
resumes-for-hiring-pretty-much-everything/. Even elite law firm employers 
make decisions based on heuristics that they think will aid their firm.  
William D. Henderson, The Bursting of the Pedigree Bubble, 21 NALP 
BULLETIN 1, 12 (2009). 
 107.  This is just an example of the discussions in philosophy regarding a 
priori versus a posteriori knowledge.  See A Priori and A Posteriori, INTERNET 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY, available at http://www.iep.utm.edu/apriori/.  
The argument can be made that a resume reflects competency by 
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However, when an employer makes a hiring decision based on 
the information displayed on a résumé108 or a response given to an 
interview question, the decision is not inherently fraught with 
controversy.  Rather, the decision engenders notions of rationality 
and legitimacy by relying on what is considered socially acceptable 
evaluative criteria.109  To hire a mega-firm, Ivy-league educated 
attorney to handle a sophisticated business transaction or high 
stakes litigation is deemed a professional, sensible decision, while 
staffing a restaurant with beautiful, busty women or handsome, 
hard-bodied men appears crude.110  This reality highlights that 
many commentators perpetuate a classic mind–body dichotomy 
that has characterized much of Western thought.111  Whereas 
things typically associated with the mind, like past academic 
performance, are viewed as something noble and praiseworthy, 
things associated with the body, like aesthetics, are not held in the 
same esteem.112  Discriminating on the basis of mental capacity is 
justified, while “discrimination based on appearance is a 
significant form of injustice.”113  Put simply, it is permissible for 
an employer not to hire an individual because the employer thinks 
the candidate is stupid, but it is wrong not to hire an individual 
because the employer thinks the candidate is ugly.  But why? 
Proponents of aesthetic antidiscrimination laws argue it is a 
“significant form of injustice” that attractive individuals may 
 
highlighting past performance, which should be indicative of future 
competence.  However, in the end, past performance does not guarantee 
future success and the decision is guided—at best—by probability.  
 108.  Assuming the decision is not driven by antiracial or antiethnic 
animus.  See Eva Derous & Ann Marie Ryan, Documenting the Adverse 
Impact of Résumé Screening: Degree of Ethnic Identification Matters, 20 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF SELECTION AND ASSESSMENT 464, 472 (2012). 
 109.  See Adamitis, supra note 35, at 221. 
 110.  Gumin, supra note 10, at 1769 (“Why should Hooters be allowed to 
decide what their employees should look like . . . ?”) 
 111.  Steven D. Edwards, The Body as Object Versus the Body as Subject: 
The Case of disability, 1 MEDICINE, HEALTH CARE AND PHILOSOPHY 47, 47 
(1998). 
 112.  See PLATO, supra note 85, at 493 (“the beauty of bodies is a thing of 
no importance.”); Gumin, supra note 10, at 1774 (“Instead of focusing on a 
person’s intellectual merits and accomplishments, employers who hire based 
on the positive characteristics they associate with an attractive appearance 
are less likely to hire the best candidate.”). 
 113.  Rhode, supra note 40, at 1035. 
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receive preferential treatment and other benefits.114  They suggest 
that such unfairness manifests itself from a very early age, 
pointing out that teachers and parents give more attention to 
attractive individuals and that, later on in life, attractive 
individuals are more likely to be hired, promoted, and earn larger 
salaries than less attractive individuals.115  However, as Harvard 
economist Robert Barro notes: “[O]utcomes based on intelligence 
are clearly unfair in the sense that, by and large, smarter people 
end up richer, and being smart is to a considerable extent a 
matter of luck.”116 Additionally, the same “unfair” early 
preferential treatment holds true for intelligent children as 
well.117  Due to the increased ease with which an intelligent child 
acquires education and learning skills, they are more likely “to 
receive psychosocial and instrumental support” from teachers 
than less intelligent students.118 
C.   Aesthetics as a Legitimate Hiring Criterion 
Many of the same reasons that commentators highlight to 
assert the unfairness created by preferential treatment for 
aesthetically-pleasing individuals actually work to validate the 
legitimacy of aesthetics as a legitimate employment criterion.  
Generally speaking—and commentators around agree—an 
individual’s visual appearance is the first thing another will 
notice.119  This noticing of another’s appearance, it is argued, 
“overpowers other personal characteristics in any interaction of 
first impression.”120 The first impression, and subsequent 
 
 114.  Id. 
 115.  Id. at 1037–39. 
 116.  Robert J. Barro, So You Want to Hire the Beautiful. Well, Why Not?, 
BUS. WK., Mar. 16, 1998, at 18.  Barro suggests—in not so many words—that 
for the most part we all are subject to an extent to make do with the 
proverbial cards we are dealt from above.  See id. 
 117.  See Judge et. al, supra note 99, at 744. 
 118.  Id. (citing S.J. Ceci & W. M. Williams, Schooling, Intelligence, and 
Income, 52 AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGIST, 1051–58 (1997)).  
 119.  See, e.g. Zakrzewski, supra note 68, at 432.  A key assumption 
running through these various analyzes is that the vast majority of 
individuals do not suffer from an uncorrected visual impairment. 
 120.  Baron, supra note 27, at 364 (citing David L. Wiley, Beauty and the 
Beast: Physical Appearance Discrimination in American Criminal Trials, 27 
ST. MARY'S L.J. 193, 201–03 (1995) (Wiley’s work discusses more in depth the 
social psychology theory of attribution that suggests individuals render 
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observations of another individual, drive one’s evaluation of that 
individual’s characteristics.121 Research suggests that 
“[a]ttractiveness corresponds with attributes such as virtue, 
integrity, intelligence, sensitivity, kindness, and honesty.”122 
While these studies suggest a positive correlation between 
one’s perceived attractiveness and the observer’s likelihood of 
attributing positive characteristics, there is also the possibility 
that this perception can, in turn, foster that particular 
characteristic in the individual.123  The research suggests that the 
positive characteristics that are associated with attractiveness can 
undergo an “expectancy confirmation.”124  Through this process, 
after “stereotypes regarding attractiveness elicit expectations that 
lead to consistently differential judgment and treatment[,] [t]hese 
outcomes are then internalized and cause development of 
differential behavior, traits, and self views.”125 
Additionally, to the extent that one’s perception of another 
drives the social interaction between the two individuals, that 
perception becomes a tangible reality.  For example, 
attractiveness can potentially make someone a more capable 
leader.126  In fact, the very notion of one whose leadership 
capabilities are driven by charisma speaks to this point.127  As 
 
judgment regarding a person’s personality and other characteristics based on 
inferences drawn from the other individual’s appearance).  
 121.  Baron, supra note 27, at 364. 
 122. Adamitis, supra note 35, at 197 (citing GORDON L. PATZER, THE 
PHYSICAL ATTRACTIVENESS PHENOMENA 1, 8 (Plenum Press 1985) and Meg 
Gehrke, Is Beauty the Beast?, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 221, 230–32 
(1994)).   
 123.  See Judge et. al, supra note 99, at 742.   
 124.  Id. (citing J.H. Langlois, From the Eye of the Beholder to Behavioral 
Reality: Physical Attractiveness, In 3 PHYSICAL APPEARANCE, STIGMA, AND 
SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 23–51 (C.P. Herman, M.P. Zanna, 
& E.T. Higgins Eds. 1986); J.H. Langlois, et. al, Maxims or myths of beauty?  
A meta-analytic and theoretical review, 126 PSYCHOLOGICAL BULLETIN, 390–
423 (2000)). 
 125.  Id. (citing J. M. Darley & R. H. Fazio, Expectancy Confirmation 
Processes Arising in the Social Interaction Sequence, 35 AMERICAN 
PSYCHOLOGIST 867–881 (1980)) (emphasis added).  
 126.  Judge et. al, supra note 99, at 750. 
 127.  See Charisma Definition, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE, http:// 
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/charisma (last visited Oct. 14, 2013) 
(“1: a personal magic of leadership arousing special popular loyalty or 
enthusiasm for a public figure (as a political leader) 2:  a special magnetic 
charm or appeal.”).   
PAGLIARINIFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2014  2:05 PM 
298 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:277 
Timothy Judge and his colleagues explain, “attractive people tend 
to be higher in extraversion, which is positively associated with 
transformational leadership behaviors.”128  Further, they assert: 
[i]mplicit leadership theory argues that people develop 
schemas of characteristics that indicate an effective 
leader. Individuals characterized and evaluated as 
leaders to the extent that they are prototypical of others’ 
schemas.  In addition to being more extraverted, 
attractive people tend to be seen as higher in intelligence, 
although the actual correlation between attractiveness 
and intelligence is negligible.  Perceptual measures of 
intelligence are more positively related to leader 
emergence than paper-and-pencil measures, indicating 
that those who are seen as intelligent are more likely to 
become leaders.  Attractive people are also viewed as less 
self-serving when engaging in efforts to wield influence 
over others which suggests that people would be more 
receptive to their attempts to attain leadership 
positions.129 
Likewise, to the extent that individuals are more likely to respond 
positively in interactions with more attractive people, the value of 
attractiveness may rise in work environments that are 
increasingly dominated by work teams.130 
The point is—as many commentators acknowledge—
aesthetics matters.  From a practical perspective, many employers 
already acknowledge this fact.131  Yet, instead of trying to 
artificially parse out job qualifications to determine when 
aesthetics is and is not a bona fide occupational qualification 
 
 128.  Judge et. al, supra note 99, at 750 (internal citations omitted).  
 129.  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 130.  See Michael Boyer O’Leary, Mark Mortensen, & Anita Woolley, 
Multiple Team Membership: A Theoretical Model of Its Effects on Productivity 
and Learning for Individuals, Teams, MIT SLOAN SCHOOL WORKING PAPER 
4752-09, at 2 (discussing the proliferation of workers who are members of 
multiple teams). 
 131.  Adamitis, supra note 35, at 195 (“One survey of interviewers found 
appearance to be the single most important factor in employee selection for a 
wide variety of jobs”) (citing Note, Facial Discrimination: Extending 
Handicap Law to Employment Discrimination on the Basis of Physical 
Appearance, 100 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2040 (1987)). 
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(BFOQ)132—a task that could very quickly lead to reductio ad 
absurdum133—a more holistic view of an employee should be 
adopted.134  In addition to what commentators refer to as “actual 
qualifications,” such as “a person’s intellectual merits”135 and 
their “academic, career [and] personal accomplishments,”136 
employers should be able to take into consideration the value the 
employee can add because of the individual’s aesthetic appeal.  
For example, many commentators cite a study that showed more 
attractive attorneys make more money than less attractive 
 
 132.  A bona fide occupational qualification defense is an affirmative 
defense that an employer can raise after a plaintiff makes out a prima facie 
case of discrimination under Title VII or the ADEA. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) 
(2006); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e). The ADEA states that “[i]t shall not be 
unlawful for an employer . . . to take any action otherwise prohibited . . . 
where age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to 
the normal operation of the particular business.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). Title 
VII provides that “it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an 
employer to hire and employ employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or 
national origin in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national 
origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the 
normal operation of that particular business or enterprise.” 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e–2(e).  Under the current framework, the court, not the employer 
defines the essence of the employer’s business and then determines if the 
discrimination is justified as being “reasonably necessary to the essence of his 
business.”  W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 413 (1985).  An 
employer can prove this necessity by showing it has “reasonable cause to 
believe” that “all or substantially all” of the discriminated group “would be 
unable to perform . . . the duties of the job involved,” or that the 
discrimination served as a “legitimate proxy for the [ ] job qualifications . . . 
and that it is ‘impossible or highly impractical’ to deal with the [ ] employees 
on an individualized basis.”  Id. at 414.  Note however, that under the current 
state of the law, an employer would not necessarily have to resort to a BFOQ 
for a pure aesthetic-based claim because discrimination on the basis of 
aesthetics is not a protected class under federal law. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 
623(f)(1); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(e).   
 133.  See supra notes 95–97 and accompanying text. 
 134.  See Avery & Crain, supra note 13, at 19.  Avery and Crain discuss 
the use of “branded service,” which is “the process of integrating the business 
image into the service itself through human resource policies.”  Id.  One 
method of delivering “branded service” is through the “ ‘transformation’ or 
‘empowerment’ approach, [which] confers control over the work process by 
transforming the working into one whose personal characteristics, 
appearance, and values match the image that the company is seeking to 
project and market.”  Id. at 20.  
 135.  Gumin, supra note 10, at 1774. 
 136.  Zakrzewski, supra note 68, at 434. 
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classmates.137  As the study suggests, even an attorney may be 
able to be more productive by being able to—quite literally—
attract clients to a firm.138 
While many argue against employers being able to extract 
value from an employee’s aesthetics, it is interesting to note that 
aesthetics is similar to “soft skills, a term used by economic 
sociologists to refer to the personality, attitude, and behavior 
requirements for employment in service sector jobs” and to 
“‘emotional labor,’ which refers to aspects of jobs that require 
workers to enact particular emotional states in order to 
manipulate clients or customers.”139  Aesthetics, soft skills, and 
emotional labor each generally involve highly subjective 
assessments of value, “focus on the embodied characteristics of 
workers,”140 and were originally “unrecognized and 
uncompensated” in the labor market.141  However, unlike 
aesthetics, now “[m]uch of the sociological literature on emotional 
labor has argued for [soft skills and emotional labor’s] recognition 
and compensation.”142  In fact, many employers now go to great 
lengths to nurture and develop the benefits of emotional labor for 
its benefit to the overall successful operation of a firm.143  While 
the notions of soft skills and emotional labor may have their 
origins in prototypical customer service industry positions, both 
are now sought-after commodities across much of the labor 
force.144 
While aesthetics may play a powerful implicit role in the 
employment context, it is time for that role to be legitimized.  
There are few—if any—individuals that would argue that the link 
 
 137.  Adamitis, supra note 35, 195 (citing Jeff Biddle & Daniel 
Hamermesh, Beauty, Productivity and Discrimination:  Lawyers’ Looks and 
Lucre, 16 J. LAB. ECON. 172, 185–90 (1998)). 
 138.  Id. at 198. 
 139.  Christine L. Williams & Catherine Connell, “Looking Good and 
Sounding Right”: Aesthetic Labor and Social Inequality in the Retail 
Industry, 37 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 349, 352 (2010) (emphasis in original). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. at 372. 
 142.  Id. (citing NANCY FOLBRE, THE INVISIBLE HEART:  ECONOMICS AND 
FAMILY VALUES (New Press 2001)). 
 143.  See, e.g., SENN DELANEY, THE HUMAN OPERATING SYSTEM:  AN OWNER’S 
MANUAL (2011) (workbook used by a leading human capital consulting firm). 
 144.  See, client list, SENN DELANEY 9 (last visited Oct. 14, 2012) , available 
at http://www.senndelaney.com/client_list.html.  
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between increased intelligence and higher wages should be 
severed.145  Indeed, people can generally recognize the value and 
efficiency of allocating brainpower to its more productive uses.146  
As Barro asserts, however: “The same reasoning applies to 
physical appearance . . . it makes no sense to say that basing 
employment and wages on physical appearance is a form of 
discrimination, whereas basing them on intelligence is not.  The 
two cases are fundamentally the same.”147  Essentially, just as 
occurs for intelligence, “the market will generate a premium for 
beauty based on the values that customers and co-workers place 
on physical appearance in various fields.”148  Like all employment 
relationships, the varying premiums generated by aesthetics will 
allow an attractive individual to demand a higher wage in 
particular areas (labor cost) and will also allow employers to 
capitalize on the surplus value that an attractive employee 
generates in excess of the labor cost.149  Thus, a holistic view of 
labor—one that takes into consideration all of an employee’s 
desirable characteristic—can inure to the benefit of both an 
employee and an employer.150 
Instead of having courts try to define what is the essence of 
an employer’s business for the purposes of a “business necessity” 
defense151—that is, when a business “sell[s] looks exclusively”152—
 
 145.  See Barro, supra note 116, at 18. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  See Stavros Mavroudeas & Alexis Ioannides, Duration, Intensity and 
Productivity of Labour and the Distinction between Absolute and Relative 
Surplus-value, 23 REVIEW OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 421, 421 (2011). 
 150.  See Avery & Crain, supra note 13, at 31. 
 151.  An employer can raise a business necessity defense against a 
disparate impact claim by showing that the “challenged practice is job related 
for the position in question and consistent with business necessity.” 42 
U.S.C.A. § 2000e–2.  Citing the landmark case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 
the Supreme Court has affirmed that the “‘touchstone’ for disparate-impact 
liability is the lack of ‘business necessity,’” that is, the “employment practice . 
. . cannot be shown to be related to job performance.”  Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 
U.S. 557, 578 (2009) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 
(1971)).  Further, as is the case with BFOQ, under the current state of the 
law, an employer would not necessarily have to resort to a business necessity 
defense for a pure aesthetic-based claim because discrimination on the basis 
of aesthetics is not a protected class under federal law. See supra note 132 
and accompanying text. 
 152.  Gumin, supra note 10, at 1771. 
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courts should apply the normal deference that is afforded to 
companies regarding the management of their own internal 
affairs.153  Though speaking about a different employment issue, 
Judge Frank Easterbrook observed that in some sense,  
“[e]verything the employer does is ‘integral’ to its business—why 
else do it?”154  As one employment practitioner advocating for the 
mandatory submission of the business judgment rule jury 
instruction in all employment discrimination cases states, it must 
be clear to a “jury that the employer cannot be liable for exercising 
its business judgment—even if harsh, unreasonable, or 
irrational—provided the employer’s reasons were not 
discriminatory” under the specific categories protected by state 
and federal antidiscrimination law.155   
In fact, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[t]he 
business necessity standard is more lenient for the employer than 
the statutory BFOQ defense.”156  Employers are generally allowed 
to utilize an employment practice that may have a disparate 
impact if the employer can demonstrate its belief that the practice 
is related to job performance.157  Courts will consider the cost and 
other burdens of a proposed alternative to a challenged practice in 
determining whether the alternative “would be equally as effective 
as the challenged practice in serving the employer’s legitimate 
business goals.”158  Further, the Supreme Court has forthrightly 
acknowledged that “[i]n evaluating claims that discretionary 
 
 153.  But cf., 42 U.S.C.A. § 12111 (“consideration shall be given to the 
employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential”) (emphasis 
added).  Under the ADA, only consideration, but not deference is afforded to 
an employer regarding what is an essential job function.  See id.  
 154.  Sec'y of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1541 
(7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., concurring). 
 155.  Robert L. Ortbals, Jr., The Case for A Business Judgment Instruction 
Under the Missouri Human Rights Act, 64 J. MO. B. 182, 184 (2008).  
 156.  In fact, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that “[t]he business 
necessity standard is more lenient for the employer than the statutory BFOQ 
defense.”  Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers 
of Am., UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991). 
 157.  See James O. Pearson, Jr., Annotation, What constitutes "business 
necessity" justifying employment practice prima facie discriminatory under 
Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e et seq.), 36 A.L.R. 
FED. 9.  The employer is not required to actually prove that the particular 
criteria will predict actual on-the-job performance.  Watson v. Fort Worth 
Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 989 (1988). 
 158.  Watson, 487 U.S. at 998. 
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employment practices are insufficiently related to legitimate 
business purposes, it must be borne in mind that courts are 
generally less competent than employers to restructure business 
practices and  therefore should not attempt to do so.”159 
This deference should largely be extended to how employers 
define what is the essence of their business, which is the first step 
in both BFOQ and business necessity analyses.  One of the most 
significant cases of a court analyzing the essence of an employer’s 
business is Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co.160 The case 
represents what I suggest is the danger of courts trying to define 
the essence of an employer’s business.  In Wilson, over one 
hundred men sued Southwest Airlines because the company 
openly refused to hire men for the high-customer contact positions 
of flight attendant and ticket agent.161  Despite acknowledging 
that “[t]he evidence was undisputed that Southwest’s unique, 
feminized image played and continues to play an important role in 
the airline’s success,” the court ultimately rejected Southwest’s 
“assertion that its females-only hiring policy is necessary for the 
continued success of its image and its business.”162  Providing its 
own determination of the essence of Southwest’s business, the 
court stated that, “[l]ike any other airline, Southwest’s primary 
function is to transport passengers safely and quickly from one 
point to another.”163 
Although not entirely foreclosing the potential validity of an 
argument based on customer preferences, the court asserted that 
“customer preference could be taken into account only when it is 
based on the company’s inability to perform the primary function 
or service it offers.”164  Such extreme subordination of the 
 
 159.  Id. at 999 (citing Furnco Const. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 
(1978)). 
 160.  517 F. Supp. 292, 293 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (analyzing the essence of 
company’s business for purposes of a BFOQ defense). 
 161.  Id. at 295. 
 162.  Id. (emphasis added).  In an act of desperation, Southwest hired an 
advertising agency, Bloom Agency, to distinguish the company from its 
competitors.  Id. at 294.  Bloom came up with a “Love” campaign, which 
sought to differentiate Southwest from the traditional conservative airline 
image by projecting Southwest as the “personification of feminine youth and 
vitality.”  Id. 
 163.  Id. at 302. 
 164.  Id. at 301 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
PAGLIARINIFINALWORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/2/2014  2:05 PM 
304 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 19:277 
importance of customer preference runs afoul of one of the core 
principles of managerial philosophy summarized by the legendary 
management guru Peter Drucker, who stated aptly that: “The 
purpose of a business is to create a customer.”165  Further, when 
courts try to impose their own view of a company’s business onto 
that employer, they create artificial and often inaccurate 
constraints.166 
While Southwest was ultimately able to remain successful in 
the aftermath of the Wilson case, albeit with a reworking of its 
previous “Love” marketing scheme, had the suit come only a few 
years prior, the company’s outcome would have been entirely 
different.167  As the Wilson court acknowledged, Southwest had 
been incorporated in 1967 and spent the first years of its corporate 
existence trying to combat legal challenges by its competitors to 
its entry into the Texas intrastate market.168  “In December of 
 
 165.  PETER F. DRUCKER, MANAGING FOR RESULTS: ECONOMIC TASKS AND 
RISK-TAKING DECISIONS 117 (1964).  See Theodore Levitt, Marketing Myopia, 1 
HARV.  BUS.  REV. 1, 19 (1960) (arguing that businesses will do better in the 
end if they concentrate on meeting customers’ needs rather than focusing on 
selling products).  In contrast, some argue that too much deference to 
customers would be against public policy.  See Rhode, supra note 40, at 1065.  
Rhode asserts that Southern employers in the early civil rights era argued 
that hiring black employees would be bad for business because it would scare 
away other customers.  Id.  However, comparing the recognition of aesthetics 
as a valuable characteristic to the grotesque racism of the post-Civil War 
south is setting up a straw-man whose very establishment borders on 
offensive.  See id. (comparing the hiring practices of Hooters and Southwest 
Airlines to the systematic refusal to hire blacks in the south after the Civil 
War). 
 166.  See Corbett, supra note 11, at 647.  In describing the Wilson case, 
Corbett notes that “[s]ome businesses build attractive individuals into their 
business identity . . . though the court rejected that argument as a matter of 
law, it was true as a matter of fact.”  Id. (emphasis added).   Additionally, 
most modern corporations are granted incorporation for intentionally vague 
business purposes, such as for “any lawful business.”  Angela Schneeman, 
“Chapter 8:  Incorporations,” THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS 
ORGANIZATIONS, at 315 (2012).  Thus, in so far as a statement of corporate 
purpose is to inform the public of the essence of the corporation’s business, 
the public should be deemed on notice that a given corporation could be 
engaged in any business.  See id. 
 167.  Ironically (or perhaps fortunately) it was the same maverick, never-
surrender corporate personality that led Southwest to adopt its “Love” 
campaign that allowed the company to succeed after the fact.  See KEVIN 
FREIBERG & JACKIE FREIBERG, NUTS!  SOUTHWEST AIRLINES’ CRAZY RECIPE FOR 
BUSINESS AND PERSONAL SUCCESS 36–40 (1996). 
 168.  Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 293. 
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1970, Southwest had $143 in the bank and was over $100,000 in 
debt, though no aircraft had ever left the ground.”169  The 
introduction of the “Love” campaign was, Southwest admits, in 
part an act of “desperation.”170  However, it was a carefully 
calculated act to attract the type of customers that predominated 
the Texas intrastate market and who otherwise would travel with 
competitors.171  Indeed, Southwest’s hiring decisions were, for all 
practical purposes, a necessity for the business to succeed at the 
time.  However, if the plaintiffs in Wilson had filed suit merely 
nine years prior, there is a significant likelihood that the company 
might not have been able overcome the burden that ruling would 
have then imposed.172 
Additionally, while Wilson dealt with sex and accompanying 
sex appeal in the context of BFOQ for airline attendants and 
ticket agents, the court’s analysis of the proper weight to be 
afforded to customer preference and its imposed definition of 
business essence are alarming.173  From a practical standpoint, 
would (and should) an employer first have to hire an individual 
and then wait for a particular negative outcome to occur before 
being able to be free to shape its hiring based on business 
necessity or BFOQ?174  For example, in Craft v. Metromedia, Inc., 
a woman was hired to be a co-anchor for a television news 
program.175  Obviously, based on the fact that the company hired 
her, the company believed the anchor to be qualified.  However, 
after almost half a year on the air, the company conducted follow-
 
 169.  Id. at 294. 
 170.  FREIBERG & FREIBERG, supra note 167, at 38. 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  See id. at 296 (indicating that the plaintiffs had filed suit prior to 
August 1980). 
 173.  Cf. Gregory J. Kramer & Edwin A. Keller, Jr. Give Me $5 Chips, a 
Jack and Coke—Hold the Cleavage: A Look at Employee Issues in the Gaming 
Industry, 7 GAMING L. REV. 335, 341 (2003) (discussing Hooters’ settlement 
with the EEOC to create gender-neutral positions at its restaurants after its 
practice of restricting the position of “Hooters Girls” to females was 
challenged and Hooters argued that being female was a BFOQ for the 
position). 
 174.  See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(employer not justified in rejecting promotion of woman to position based on 
fact that Latin American and Southeast Customers were reluctant to do 
business with a woman). 
 175.  766 F.2d 1205, 1208 (8th Cir. 1985). 
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up research to evaluate how the news station’s audience was 
responding to the anchor’s performance.176  The response to the 
anchor’s appearance was “overwhelmingly negative” and the 
company subsequently moved the anchor to a different, off-air 
position, though with the same pay and benefits.177  As part of its 
reasoning rejecting the anchor’s claims of discrimination on the 
basis of sex, the court noted that the company’s “reasonable 
appearance requirements were ‘obviously critical’ to [the 
company’s] economic well-being.”178 
One has to wonder: if the Craft plaintiff’s claim had been a 
pure aesthetic-based claim (presuming such a law were put in 
place), would the employer have had to wait until the plaintiff was 
unable to perform to the satisfaction of the audience, or would the 
employer have been empowered to exercise its judgment and 
determine that a more aesthetically pleasing anchor would be 
necessary to meet the demands of its audience?  Provided 
compliance with all other antidiscrimination laws, based on the 
above scenario, I submit that it would be illogical to restrict an 
employer from exercising its judgment as to a potential employee’s 
ability to perform based on aesthetics, ex ante, when the 
employer—as the Eighth Circuit found—is perfectly justified in 
making that same decision, ex post.  Indeed, while some 
commentators suggest that a focus on aesthetics can contribute to 
inefficiencies in the workforce,179 the above scenario shows how 
not empowering employers to discriminate (i.e. consider) on the 
basis of aesthetics undoubtedly would be tremendously inefficient. 
PART III 
While I have argued that aesthetics should be a legitimate 
hiring criterion (across all fields and positions, not just “looks” 
positions) and that, like all other legitimate hiring criteria, the 
particular value, weight, and amount of consideration that 
 
 176.  Id. at 1208–09.  This was done through “focus group” discussions 
moderated by a company representative.  Id. at 1209. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. at 1215.  The court also acknowledged that the “evidence shows a 
consistent concern by management over the appearance of all on-air 
personnel without regard to sex but with regard to the peculiar 
characteristics of each employee.”  Id. at 1213, n. 7. 
 179.  See, e.g., Gumin, supra note 10, at 1774. 
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aesthetics should be afforded should largely be at the sole 
discretion and prerogative of employers, I do acknowledge the 
potential hazards of giving an employer complete and total 
unfettered discretion over all decisions in the employment 
context.180 
Even if many employees are not aware of this fact,181 the 
default rule in 49 out of 50 states is that all employment is at-will, 
wherein either party can terminate the relationship “for a good 
reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all.”182 However, the 
significant caveat to that presumption is that the reason for the 
employer terminating the relationship cannot be one that violates 
local, state, or federal law.183  Additionally, while the at-will 
doctrine is at times justified by its promotion of symmetry in the 
employment context (i.e. both the employer and the employee are 
at least theoretically on equal footing),184 the doctrine cannot be 
analyzed outside of its practical import, and, at times, the 
relatively unequal balance of power between employers and their 
employees.  In turn, by recognizing aesthetics as a legitimate 
employment criterion, a blind eye need not be turned to the 
manner in which employers take action based on that criterion. 
Desiring individuals with certain qualities (e.g. naturally 
 
 180.  For a provocative, yet well-articulated piece that, as the title 
suggests, takes issue with the whole concept of antidiscrimination laws, see 
Richard A. Epstein, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:  THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992).  Epstein’s work is infused with his strong 
libertarian views and draws from the Lockean labor theory wherein 
individuals, as the exclusive owner of their own labor, should be free to utilize 
that labor as he or she sees fit.  See id. at 20–58;  see also, John J. Donohue 
III, Advocacy Versus Analysis in Assessing Employment Discrimination Law, 
44 STAN. L. REV. 1583, 1590 (1992) (arguing that an unregulated market will 
actually eliminate discrimination). 
 181.  See Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong Are Employees About Their 
Rights, and Why Does It Matter?, 77 N.Y.U.L. REV. 6, 7 (2002) (explaining 
that most employees are not aware that they are employees-at-will and 
terminable without cause). 
 182.  Corbett, supra note 11, at 656.  “Therefore, in every U.S. state except 
Montana, an employer does not have to offer good cause for termination 
unless the employee claims that the reason for termination constitutes a 
breach of contract, amounts to a tort, or violates a statute.” Id. 
 183.  Id.  Further, many recognize that there have been significant inroads 
over the years into the at-will doctrine that prevent employers from truly 
exercising complete control over employees.  Id. at 657–58. 
 184.  See, e.g., Forrer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 153 N.W.2d 587, 589 (Wis. 
1967). 
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blonde hair, blue eyes) could clearly have an inherently disparate 
impact against certain protected classes under Title VII.  Further, 
allowing unfettered deference to an employer’s aesthetic 
preferences could provide a backdoor way to unlawfully 
discriminate against protected classes.  For example, an employer 
could try to assert that they honestly preferred the attractiveness 
of a particular race (or conversely, did not find a particular race 
attractive).  However, irrespective of the honesty of the employer’s 
personal preference, such discrimination would nonetheless run 
afoul of Title VII because it would be illegal discrimination on the 
basis of race.185  Additionally, under such circumstances said 
employer would not be able to avail itself of a BFOQ defense.186 
Proponents of an aesthetic antidiscrimination law argue that 
aesthetic discrimination can compound existing inequalities 
already suffered by protected classes.187  One argument is that 
perceptions of what constitutes attractiveness are in part shaped 
by our surrounding culture and environment.188  Accordingly, the 
argument follows that allowing employers to consider aesthetics 
will simply condone the imposition of the majority’s view of 
attractiveness.189  Thus, in an effort to gain acceptance (i.e. 
employment), members of the non-majority will be forced to 
“assimilate to dominant norms.”190  The exertion of such pressure 
could undoubtedly have adverse societal consequences, especially 
if an employer—like the one described in the paragraph above—
imposed its attractiveness standards to exclude protected 
classes.191 
Yet, even if aesthetics is treated as a legitimate hiring 
 
 185.  See 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et. seq. 
 186.  Congress has not provided a BFOQ defense for discrimination on the 
basis of race. 
 187.  See Rhode, supra note 40, at 1052. 
 188.  Ritu Mahajan, Comment, The Naked Truth: Appearance 
Discrimination, Employment, and the Law, 14 ASIAN AM. L.J. 165, 167 (2007). 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. at 174. 
 191.  It is also important to highlight that similar arguments are raised in 
regard to standards of intelligence.  See Roy Freedle, How and Why 
Standardized Tests Systematically Underestimate African-Americans' True 
Verbal Ability and What to Do About It: Towards the Promotion of Two New 
Theories with Practical Applications, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 183, 187 (2006).  
Freedle argues that standardized tests, including conventional intelligent 
quotient (IQ) tests, are biased against certain groups of minorities. Id. 
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criterion, the situation cannot get that ugly.  By ensuring robust 
enforcement of the current statutory and common law protections, 
an appropriate balance can be struck that will be beneficial to 
both employees and employers.192  Criticism that, if aesthetics 
was a completely valid criterion, then it would be difficult for 
employees to show that the particular aesthetic standard had a 
discriminatory impact, is largely a criticism of the general 
difficulties of proof that all plaintiff-employees have to bear in 
employment discrimination cases.193 
However, opening up aesthetics as a legitimate hiring 
criterion could actually improve societal acceptance and norms by 
making employers see the aesthetic value that can transcend all 
protected classes.  Even one of the staunchest proponents of 
aesthetic antidiscrimination protection notes: 
[T]he globalization of mass media and information 
technology has brought an increasing convergence in 
standards of attractiveness. 
Researchers on appearance have achieved a substantial 
measure of reliability through a “truth in consensus” 
method.  In essence, subjects rate a photograph or  an 
individual on a scale of attractiveness, and those ratings 
are then averaged to produce an overall assessment.  
Such methods yield a strikingly high degree of consensus 
even among individuals of different sex, race, age, 
socioeconomic status, and cultural backgrounds.194 
This suggests a certain amount of objectivity in the evaluation 
 
 192.  In fact, this is what occurred in the Abercombie & Fitch cases.  See 
Lawrence E. Dube. Court Sends Religious Bias Case to Trial: Employee Quit 
Over Retailer's “Look Policy,” [2009] Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 211, at A-6 
(Nov. 4, 2009) (discussing EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 
4:08CV1470 JCH, 2009 WL 3517578 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 26, 2009)).  Thus, this 
shows that there are undoubtedly some benefits that have occurred because 
of lawsuits by some plaintiffs.  See id.  Abercombie still hires for 
attractiveness, but does so through a very thorough diversity policy.  Id. 
 193.  See e.g., Mahajan, supra note 188, at 177–80. 
 194.  Rhode, supra note 40, at 1036 (citing LINDA A. JACKSON, PHYSICAL 
APPEARANCE AND GENDER: SOCIOBIOLOGICAL AND SOCIOCULTURAL 
PERSPECTIVES 4 (1992)(empahsis added); Patzer, supra note 122, at 5; Vicki 
Ritts, Miles Patterson & Mark E. Tubbs, Expectations, Impressions, and 
Judgments of Physically Attractive Students: A Review, 62 REV. EDUC. RES. 
413, 414 (1992). 
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of aesthetics.  Of course, there will always be a degree of 
subjectivity in such an evaluation.  However, just as there are 
different types of intelligence (e.g. logical-mathematical, linguistic, 
musical, etc.),195 there are different types of features and 
characteristics that can be aesthetically pleasing (e.g. charming 
smile, clear skin).  Just as all types of intelligence should be 
afforded their respective praise, so too should different types of 
aesthetic characteristics. 
Giving full recognition to aesthetics as a legitimate 
employment criterion can inure to the benefit of employees by 
allowing individuals to extract a proper wage premium based on 
this characteristic and also to promote the celebration of aesthetic 
value across all protected classes.  Additionally, employers will 
benefit by being more empowered to utilize the value of aesthetics 
for the benefit of their business.  By being upfront and candid 
about their intent to take an employee’s aesthetics into 
consideration, there will be less opportunity for employers to be 
sued under purely aesthetic-based claims.196 Further, by 
informing employees that aesthetics is a legitimate criterion that 
will be taken into account, employers will be in a better position to 
protect themselves against retaliation claims.197  Indeed, under 
antiretaliation provisions, a plaintiff does not necessarily have to 
succeed on the underlying discrimination claim in order to 
successfully pursue a retaliation claim.198  A plaintiff need only 
establish a reasonable, good-faith belief that the employer’s action 
violated either Title VII or the ADEA.199  Thus, by recognizing the 
legitimacy of aesthetics as a valid criterion and then engaging in 
an effort to discuss how aesthetics will be taken into account on a 
 
 195.  See generally HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF 
MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES (2011).  Indeed, between a mechanic that can fix 
anything in an automobile, a physician that can perform any surgery, a 
singer that can hit any note, a mathematician that can balance any 
equation—(and the list goes on )—is there really a truly objective measure of 
which is the most intelligent feat? 
 196.  See supra Part I. 
 197.  See Corbett, supra note 11, at 649–51. Under anti-retaliation 
clauses, retaliation claims are demonstrated by showing that the employee 
engaged in a protected activity, that the employer took adverse employment 
action against the employee, and that there is a causal connection between 
the protected activity and the adverse action.  Id.    
 198.  Id. at 650. 
 199.  Id. 
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non-discriminatory, even-handed manner, employers can more 
adequately protect themselves from retaliation claims. 
Further, such upfront discussion about the role aesthetics will 
play in the work environment can allow for a more candid and 
honest exchange between employers and employees.  This can also 
inure to the benefit of employees that may be discharged for a 
purely aesthetic reason.  Instead of forcing an employer to conjure 
up evidence to justify its decision, an employer’s ability to take 
adverse employment action on the basis of aesthetics can reduce 
the amount of pretextual reasons the employer may otherwise 
give.200  For example, the recent case of Nelson v. James H. Knight 
DDS, P.C., highlights a perfect example of aesthetics playing a 
legitimate role in the employment context.201  Although the Iowa 
Supreme Court altered its rationale with the superseding opinion 
of Nelson II, the underlying facts remained the same, providing an 
interesting example of someone fired for being too attractive, not 
for being too unattractive.202  In Nelson I, a male dentist hired a 
 
 200.  See Rhode, supra note 40, at 1069 (discussing employers’ reluctance 
to acknowledge unattractiveness as reason for employment action). 
 201.  No. 11-1857, 2012 WL 6652747, at *5 (Iowa Dec. 21, 2012) 
(hereinafter Nelson I), withdrawn and superseded on rehearing by 834 
N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013) (hereinafter Nelson II).  The Iowa Supreme Court 
granted rehearing and issued a superseding opinion in the case.  Although, as 
Todd Pettys, Associate Dean at the University of Iowa College of Law notes, 
“[i]t’s still not clear . . . exactly why the court agreed to rehear the case.”  O. 
Kay Henderson, U-of-I Law Professor: Court’s Second Ruling on “Too 
Attractive” Case “Curious”, RADIO IOWA (July 12, 2013), http://www.radioiowa 
.com/2013/07/12/u-of-i-law-professor-courts-second-ruling-on-too-attractive-
case-curious.  Indeed, as Dean Pettys points out, “[n]one of the justices 
changed their vote.”  Id.  However, one must suspect that the justices—being 
in a judicial election state—knew all too well the dangers of issuing an 
unpopular decision. See O. Kay Henderson, National Report Tracks Spending 
in Iowa’s 2012 Judicial Retention Election, RADIO IOWA (Oct. 24, 2013), 
http://www.radioiowa.com/2013/10/24/national-report-tracks-spending-in-
iowas-2012-judicial-retention-election/ (discussing that three justices of the 
Iowa Supreme Court were voted off the bench as part of backlash from a 
decision legalizing same-sex marriage in Iowa). 
 202.  Nelson I, 2012 WL 6652747, at *5.  Unfortunately, in Nelson II, the 
Iowa Supreme Court retreated from the simple and straightforward rationale 
of its previous opinion, by focusing on the dentist’s wife’s discontent with the 
nature of the relationship between the dentist and the assistant.  834 N.W.2d 
at 72.  The majority, in dicta, suggested that it would be impermissible sex 
discrimination to take employment action “based on stereotypes related to 
the characteristics of . . . gender, including attributes of attractiveness.”  Id. 
at 77.  In his concurrence, Chief Justice Mark Cady went so far as to suggest 
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female dental assistant (the plaintiff).203  The assistant worked for 
the dentist for over ten-and-a-half years, and, while the dentist 
had complained on several occasions that the assistant’s “clothing 
was too tight and revealing and ‘distracting,’” the dentist admitted 
that she “had not done anything wrong or inappropriate and that 
she was the best dental assistant he ever had.”204  Similarly, 
although the dentist had engaged in a few conversations via text 
and in-person that contained sexual content, the assistant 
admitted that the dentist “generally treated her with respect, and 
she believed him to be a person of high integrity . . . [whom she] 
considered [ ] to be a friend and father figure.”205  There was no 
allegation of sexual harassment in the case.  However, the dentist 
fired the assistant, at his wife’s request, because “he feared he 
would try to have an affair with her down the road if he did not 
fire her.”206  In short, the dentist found the assistant too 
attractive.  However, rather than lie about the job performance of 
the “best dental assistant he ever had,” the dentist could be 
upfront about his concern.  In future cases, employers could utilize 
this reasoning and be upfront about aesthetic concerns to ensure 
there are no retaliation claims and no need to resort to pre-textual 
firing.207 
Proponents of aesthetic antidiscrimination protection argue 
that there are tremendously dangerous costs to both society and 
individuals that are associated with the obsession and pursuit of 
attractiveness.208  They argue, citing numerous studies and 
statistics, that obsession with appearance can lead to anxiety, low 
 
that, even in the absence of gender stereotyping, “an employer cannot legally 
fire an employee simply because the employer finds the employee too 
attractive or not attractive enough.”  Id.  (Cady, C.J., specially concurring).  
 203.  Nelson I, 2012 WL 6652747, at *1. 
 204.  Id. at *1–*2. 
 205.  Id. at *1.  
 206.  Id. at *2.   The court noted that the dentist hired another female for 
the position.  Id. 
 207.  It is important to note that while the dentist in Nelson I may have 
been sexually attracted to the assistant, recognition of someone as 
aesthetically pleasing does not in any way have to be coextensive with a 
sexual desire.  Individuals can recognize someone as aesthetically pleasing, 
like a work of art, without having to be sexually attracted to him or her.  But 
see Nelson II, 834 N.W.2d at 77 (Cady, C.J., specially concurring) (suggesting 
that any decision based on attractiveness would be impermissible sex 
discrimination).  
 208.  Rhode, supra note 40, at 1035–47. 
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self-esteem, and other psychological disorders, including 
depression.209  Further, they point out the exorbitant sums of 
money that individuals spend on improving their appearances and 
the vast amount of time that is wasted in such pursuits.210  But is 
preoccupation with intelligence any better?  Take an example that 
is close to home.  The competitive environment that surrounds law 
schools is well known.  However, probably less well known is that: 
While students enter law school suffering from clinical 
stress and depression at a rate that mirrors the national 
average . . . during the first year of law school [] [s]tudies 
have shown that law students suffer from clinical stress 
and depression at a rate that is three to four times higher 
than the national average  . . .  [and] that student stress 
rises steadily through the third year of law school.211 
Yet, obsession with intelligence and academic performance to 
the point of developing unhealthy stress and other harmful 
consequences can begin, and often does, well before graduate 
school.212  Though more thorough studies are needed, some 
estimates from doctors and students at high schools with high 
performance standards suggest that between 15 to 40 percent of 
students abuse amphetamines, like Adderall, as study aids 
without a prescription.213  Abuse of such drugs can lead to 
depression, heart problems, and, for many, a path to addiction to 
harder substances like Percocet, OxyContin, and even heroin.214  
Additionally, the exponentially increasing amount of student debt 
racked up in pursuit of education has a profoundly negative 
impact not only on individual students, but on society as a 
whole.215 
 
 209.  Id. at 1040 and accompanying notes. 
 210.  Id. at 1041–42 and accompanying notes. 
 211.  HERBERT N. RAMY, SUCCEEDING IN LAW SCHOOL 29 (2006) (citing 
Stephen B. Shanfield & G. Andrew H. Benjamin, Psychiatric Distress in Law 
Students, 35 J. LEGAL. EDUC. 65 n. 1 (1985)). 
 212.  Alan Schwarz, Risky Rise of the Good-Grade Pill, NEW YORK TIMES, 
June 9, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/10/ 
education/seeking-academic-edge-teenagers-abuse-s.  
 213.  Id. 
 214.  Id. 
 215.  Charles M. Blow, A Dangerous “New Normal” in College Debt, 
NYTIMES.COM, Mar. 8, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013 
/03/09/opinion/blow-a-dangerous-new-normal-in-college-debt.html?_r=0; John 
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CONCLUSION 
It is clear that there are dangers associated with obsession 
and blind pursuit of both attractiveness and intelligence.  
However, research shows that either characteristic can positively 
impact one’s ability to succeed in life.216  Yet, many of the 
proponents of aesthetic antidiscrimination protection can take 
solace in studies whose findings suggest that “the brainy are not 
necessarily at a disadvantage to the beautiful.”217  What this 
comment has sought to demonstrate is that both mind 
(intelligence) and body (aesthetics) should be considered relevant 
criteria for employment purposes.  Both characteristics are—for 
better or for worse—partly controlled by the great birth lottery of 
luck.  It is also important to remember that individuals do not 
necessarily remain what society may consider unattractive218 or 
unintelligent219 throughout life.  Still, we should all take note that 
irrespective of one’s attractiveness or intelligence, a high degree of 
confidence and self-worth can provide the same degree of 
success—at least financially speaking—as the lauded 
characteristics of attractiveness and intelligence.220 
At the end of the day, employers should feel empowered to 
take an entirely holistic view of an employee into consideration in 
order to make decisions regarding the employee’s actual and 
perceived value to the company.  Individuals should recognize that 
there is a difference between someone’s intrinsic value as a human 
being221 versus their value to the particular demands of an 
 
Hechinger, Overdue Student Loans Reach Record as U.S. Graduates Seek 
Jobs, BLOOMBERG.COM, May 23, 2013, http://www.bloomberg 
.com/news/2013-05-23/overdue-student-loans-reach-record-as-u-s-graduates-
seek-jobs.html. 
 216.  See Judge et. al., supra note 99, at 749. 
 217.  Id. 
 218.  See, e.g., James Harris, The Best Celebrity Yearbook Photos: George 
Clooney, COMPLEXSTYLE, Feb. 6, 2013, http://www.complex.com/style/ 
2013/02/the-50-best-celebrity-yearbook-photos/george-clooney.  
 219.  See, e.g., Biography: Richard Branson, BIO.COM, http://www. 
biography.com/people/richard-branson-9224520.  
 220.  See Judge et. al, supra note 99, at 749. 
 221.  See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 
30, (James W. Ellington trans. 1785) (1993) (stating Kant’s second categorical 
imperative:  “Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your 
own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, 
but always at the same time as an end.”). 
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employer.  Additionally, while an employer should be empowered 
to take both aesthetics and intelligence into account, the employer 
should still be respectful regarding their evaluations of employees.  
It is a misconception to assume that an employer cannot demand 
high, exacting standards from employees and still treat them with 
respect.222  And, if we recognize all of the different types of value 
individuals can bring to the workforce and encourage and enforce 
that respect for all employees, it indeed will not get that ugly. 
 
 
 222.  See, e.g, FREIBERG & FREIBERG, supra note 167, at 315.  “It’s very 
important to value people as individuals, not just employees . . . I don’t use 
the word employees very much, and I never use the word management.  I just 
refer to the people of Southwest Airlines, and we really try to treat them as 
people and recognize each one’s individuality,” said Herb Kelleher, the former 
CEO of Southwest Airlines, whose policy of hiring attractive airline 
attendants many aesthetic antidiscrimination proponents have harshly 
criticized.  Id. 
